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Category III Films and VCDs: The
Failure of Deterrence in the Copyright
Ordinance of Hong Kong

ABSTRACT

In 1997, the government of Hong Kong enacted the Copyright
Ordinance. The goal of the Ordinance was to establish a strong
deterrent against the illegal manufacture and sale of copyright
infringingmaterials,especiallypirated video and digital compact
discs. Courts have interpretedthe Ordinanceto allow the Customs
and Excise Departmentsweepingpowers of searchand seizure. As
a result, the government has seized many thousands of copyright
infringing video compact discs and courts have enforced lengthy
custodial sentences againstguilty parties.
Despite these efforts, though, film piracy continues to grow
throughout Hong Kong and transnational film interests have
begun to call for even more stiff penalties and greaterdeterrence.
The failure of the current deterrent in the Ordinance, however,
suggests that continuing with that approachto combatpiracy will
most likely fail. As a result, this Note examines the many cultural
and legal issues surroundingthe supply and demand for copyright
infringing discs and argues that Hong Kong must take a different
approach, not relying on deterrence, to resolve this growing
problem.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1997, as the Chinese government assumed control over the
British city-state of Hong Kong, Jackie Chan reigned as the undisputed
box office champion of Hong Kong domestic and transnational film. 1
While Jackie Chan was producing, starring in, and directing big budget
action thrillers, smaller budget category III films continued to claim a
larger percentage of the Hong Kong cinema market by producing films,
for example, where a man is kidnaped in his own home, beaten, and
maimed by an assailant posing as a relative. 2 Such was the multifarious
state of the Hong Kong film industry in 1997 when the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Legislative Counsel enacted the
Copyright Ordinance. 3 Although category III films did not have a direct
bearing on the decision to enact the Copyright Ordinance, 4 the rising
demand for these quasi-pornographic films substantially contributed to a
decline in cinema attendance and led to the growth in the underground
Video Compact Disc (VCD) market that the Copyright Ordinance
intended to dismantle through the creation of harsh penalties for
5
unauthorized VCD manufacturing and distribution.
The Legislative Counsel enacted the Copyright Ordinance in
response to pressure brought to bear by the local and transnational
movie industries. The steady decline in revenues throughout the first
half of the 1990s, combined with the Triad infiltration of the Hong Kong
film industry, resulted in studio and cinema executives demanding that
the government protect their intellectual property and, consequently,
their profits. The Legislature responded by passing an ordinance
intended to deter illegal VCD manufacturing and distribution by
creating more stiff penalties, both fines and incarceration, that dwarfed

1.
See generally Steve Fore, Jackie Chan and the CulturalDynamics of Global
Entertainment,in TRANSNATIONAL CHINESE CINEMAS 239, 239-58 (Sheldon Hsiao-peng
Lu, ed., 1997). Jackie Chan was the top box office draw in Hong Kong and his films,
such as Rumble in the Bronx and Rush Hour, had begun to penetrate the U.S. market
and generate substantial revenues.
2.
See INTRUDER (1997).
3.
H.K. Ord. No. 92 (1997).
4.
In fact, in all likelihood the emerging VCD market for category III films had
nothing to do with the passage of the ordinance. Pressure from the domestic and
transnational film industries, concerned with the protection of their copyrights,
prompted the enactment of the law.
5.
See, e.g., Rhonda Lam Wan and Elaine Pak Li, Copyright Crackdown Pledge;
Anti-Piracy Battle to get More Troops, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 19, 1999, at 4
(stating that Hong Kong customs requested that the government hire 48 new staffers to
assist in the growing anti-piracy battle with VCD manufacturers).
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the previous British law in every respect. 6 What the industries and the
Legislature failed to realize, however, was that the absence of a law with
a strong deterrent did not produce the illegal VCD market. Rather, the
declining quality of the Hong Kong cinema, combined with the salacious
appeal of category III films, coalesced to create an underground market
that has grown, rather than shrunk, since the enactment of the
deterrent
Ordinance. Despite the evidence of a conclusive study, the
7
effective.
prove
to
failed
has
Legislature
the
by
envisioned
This Note focuses on the diverse factors that have produced the
illegal VCD market in Hong Kong, its impact on intellectual property
law in the HKSAR, and why the interconnectedness of law and culture
has resulted in an underground market that refuses to yield to an everstronger legal deterrent. Furthermore, this Note offers alternative
solutions to address this growing problem. Part I presents a detailed
history and analysis of the Hong Kong transnational film market and
the new intellectual property laws designed to protect it, showing that
the Legislature yielded to political and economic pressures, both
domestic and international, in enacting the Copyright Ordinance. Part
II examines the cases appearing before Hong Kong courts that
specifically addressed the Copyright Ordinance and VCDs. It will show
that since 1999, a trend toward guilty verdicts with more stiff penalties
for individuals convicted under this statute has emerged in a continuing
effort to deter future violations. Then, Part II acknowledges the recently
apparent, though illusory, effort to lessen the harsh penalties under the
Copyright Ordinance. Finally, Part III of this Note argues that the
Copyright Ordinance and the decisions of the courts have not created an
effective deterrent to the underground VCD market. Instead, these
intellectual property laws have resulted in superfluous police powers for
the Customs Department and have interfered substantially with the
video and digital reproduction business of the region. As a result, Part
III contends that the deterrent effect of the Copyright Ordinance has, in
all appearance, failed and that a conclusive study should be conducted
either to deny or to confirm this assumption. Furthermore, Part III
suggests that the more effective method to address the growing illegal
VCD problem would be to eliminate or reduce the pervasive influence of
category III films on the Hong Kong market and culture.

6.
7.

See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part III.
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I.BACKGROUND

A. Hong Kong's Film Culture
To understand the impetus behind the passage of the Copyright
Ordinance, it is first necessary to understand the market that the
Ordinance, in part, attempts to regulate. Although Hong Kong for many
years has remained a market for diverse domestic and foreign films, over
the past 14 years Hong Kong has seen a rise in category III films.8 In
1998 and 1999, 47 percent of all films released in Hong Kong, including
those released straight to video, garnered a category III rating. 9 In
2000, 22 percent of all films shown in theaters received a category III
rating.1 0 Furthermore, the theater managers do little to distinguish
between category III films and category I or II films. Instead, cinemas
show category III films in the same theaters that present family films
and the rental chain Blockbuster places films like Sex and Zen III on
their shelves next to Jackie Chan action movies. 11 Despite the age
restrictions on who may view a category III film, 12 the appeal of these
movies is growing unabated. 13 The growth of the underground VCD
market has hindered the effectiveness of age restrictions for category III.
A 1999 study conducted by the HKSAR government revealed that 66

8.

The Internet Movie Database lists 281 films that have received a category

III rating in Hong Kong and this list represents only the films that have been

translated into an English title. See http://us.imdb.com. Although the Hong Kong film
rating classification system is similar to the U.S. MPAA ratings, category III films are
without comparison. Category III is the highest restriction in Hong Kong and the close
equivalent of the MPAA NC-17 rating. Category III films, however, are notorious for
showing scenes of violence and sex that, while not qualifying as illegal pornography
under Hong Kong law, can best be characterized as "pornoviolence."
9.
Darrell W. Davis & Yeh Yueh-yu, Warning! Category III: The Other Hong
Kong Cinema, 54 FILM Q. 4, 12 (2001).
10.
Film
Classification
in
Hong
Kong,
at
http://www.info.gov.hklinfo/filmcnsr.htm. Category III films are recognized by their
distinctive triangle marking with a roman numeral III contained within.
11.
See Davis, supra note 9, at 13. Category III films are played at mainstream
cinemas, including those theaters owned by United Artists, Golden Harvest, and AMC.
12.
Category I films are rated suitable for all ages. Category IIA and IIB films
carry warnings, similar to the MPAA PG and PG-13 warnings, that some material may
not be suitable for viewers of varying ages, but those ratings are only advisory. Only
category III films enforce an age requirement for viewing. See Film Classification in
Hong Kong, supra note 10.
13.
See Davis, supra note 9, at 13.
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percent of the teenagers surveyed had
watched a category III film either
14
at their home or at a friend's home.
The pervasive availability of these films results from aggressive
marketing to a widening base of category III customers and reliance on a
"forbidden fruit" appeal. Producers create and market category III films
to all tastes and genres. Distributors even use the age restriction
associated with category III status as a marketing tool. 15 A category III
rating means "the film will probably contain explicit, but not hardcore
sex, gruesome violence, indecent language, or all three."'1 6 While it is not
the goal of this Note to examine what segments of the Hong Kong
population prefer certain types of category III films, their growing
popularity proves that a market exists. Additionally, the producers of
category III films have expanded their sales by creating films that
appeal to subgroups within the category III market: quasipornographic, 17 genre films,' 8 and pornoviolence. 19 Although some

14.
Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Information Technology and
Broadcasting, 1998 Public Opinion Survey on the Film Classification System (Feb. 8,
1999), at http://www.legco.gov.hk [hereinafter Legco Survey].
15.
Davis, supra note 9, at 14.
16.
Id.
17.
Quasi-pornographic category III films center on scopophilia and sexual
gratification. Thus, the nude female form and female sexual organs invariably are
included in the films. To distinguish itself from hardcore pornography, these films are
loosely based on classical literature and Confucian values. See id. These attempts to
distinguish, however, are often feeble. See, e.g., SEX AND ZEN (1991); PRETTY WOMAN
(1991); EROTIC GHOST STORY (1991); THE RAPE (1994); SEX AND ZEN III (1998) (depicting
a scholar who meets a kung-fu master with four wives. The master saves the scholar
from being raped by bandits and then teaches him sexual positions such as "Frog
Climbing Stone" and "Tiger Walking Downhill" as contained in the "Thirteen Tricks
Recorded in the Virgin Book.").
18.
Virtually any classic genre of film can and has received category III
treatment. There is a crime and gangster genre. See, e.g., CASINO (1998); ORGANIZED
CRIME AND TRIAD BUREAU (1994); 9413 (1998); WOMEN ON THE RUN (1993); YOUNG AND
DANGEROUS (1997) (rated category III for foul language); TRIADS: THE INSIDE STORY
(1989) (starring Chow Yun-fat before he had attained his current status); ISLAND OF
FIRE (1991) (starring, ironically, Jackie Chan). There is a horror genre. See, e.g.,
BLOODY BEAST (1994); GHOST KILLER (1992). There is a detective sub-genre. See, e.g.,
NAKED KILLER (1992); CAGEMAN (1992) (receiving the category III rating for foul
language); TWENTY-SOMETHING (1994); THE ACCIDENT (1998); VIVA EROTICA (1996);
TEMPTATION OF A MONK (1993); HAPPY TOGETHER (1997). Even some children's films
have received this rating. See, e.g., THE FRUIT IS SWELLING (1997); THE FRUIT IS
SWELLING 11 (1997); THE FRUIT IS SWELLING III (1997); PINK LADY (1992) (combining
adolescent anime and teen fashions with a violent lesbian love triangle among Catholic
school girls). There is also a genre of category III films marketed toward women. See,
e.g., WOMEN ON THE RUN (1993) (involving a female heroine who wants to escape her
pimp and eventually kills him).
19.
These unique films are not quite pornography and carry none of the genre
conventions of mainstream films. They include gruesome tales of police cases. See, e.g.,
SENTENCED TO HANG (1989) (recounting the story of the last criminals to be hung in
Hong Kong); THE BRAEMAR HILLS MURDERS (1992); DAUGHTER OF DARKNESS (1994);
DAUGHTER OF DARKNESS 11 (1994); DAUGHTER OF DARKNESS 111 (1994); A DAY WITHOUT
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large-budget mainstream films do receive category III ratings in Hong
Kong, 20 most category III films appeal to a subculture or underground
market. Although producers target category III films at a specific,
mostly heterosexual male demographic,2 1 the influence of these filmsespecially the decision to play them at mainstream theaters-has had a
substantial impact on the overall film market and average consumers as
a whole.
In 1999, a film industry survey conducted in Hong Kong revealed
that the average consumer attributed the rise in intellectual piracy to
the declining quality of films released in the region. 22 A Democratic

Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong poll found that 77.6 percent of
respondents considered films released in Hong Kong to be of poor
quality. 23 Forty-four percent of respondents also indicated that they
would buy pirated VCDs and an overwhelming 74 percent indicated that

POLICEMEN (1995) (involving scenes of graphic violence and rape); THE SWEET SMELL OF
DEATH (1993); LEGAL INNOCENCE (1993) (involving a serial killer who keeps body parts
of his victims in his refrigerator, boils his girlfriend's puppy in a pot of soup, and then
feeds it to her); THE UNTOLD STORY (1993) (telling the tale of a serial killer who uses
chopsticks to violate an employee and then cannibalizes her body); THE UNTOLD STORY
11 (1993) (involving a woman who is a serial killer); THE UNTOLD STORY III (1993); DR.
LAMB (1992) (includes scenes of mutilation); THE TUEN MUN RAPIST (1994); THE TUEN
MUN RAPIST 11 (1994); THE TUEN MUN RAPIST III (1994); HORRIBLE HIGH HEELS (1995)
(describing a psychotic tanner who flays his victims in order to make fashionable shoes);
EBOLA SYNDROME (1996) (telling the story of a man who rapes a woman in Africa,
contracts ebola, and then spreads the virus around China by raping other women);
LOVE TO KILL (1993) (involving a son watching his father kill his mother with an axe);
NAKED KILLER (1992) (telling the story of a female assassin who takes pleasure in
mutilating her male victims); TAxI HUNTER (1993) (telling the story of a killer who
exacts his revenge on the cabby community that killed his pregnant wife); TWIST (1995)
(telling the story of police officers who, in an effort to evade human rights laws, extract
confessions from their suspects by torturing them, including penetrating a female
suspect with an ice filled condom); RED TO KILL (1994); REMAINS OF A WOMAN (1993);
O.C.T.B. CASEBTHE FLOATING BODY (1995). They also include period pieces that impart
minuscule historical knowledge. See, e.g., ANCIENT CHINESE WHOREHOUSE (1994); THE
CHINESE TORTURE CHAMBER (1994); THE CHINESE TORTURE CHAMBER 11 (1994). Unlike
claims that pornography objectifies women, these films are literally about
objectification. Often, these films depict the stages and processes undertaken to
transform a human body, usually female, into something else. Murder is not the climax
of the story. These films relish the disposal of murdered bodies and include methods
such as cannibalism, methodical dismemberment, and the reduction of the female body
into cubes of flesh which the male protagonist can then submerge in acid.
20.
The U.S. films WILD THINGS (1997), ANOTHER DAY IN PARADISE (Chinese
Bookie Pictures 1998), HAPPINESS (1998), and EYES WIDE SHUT (1998) all received
category III ratings because of their content.
21.
See supra note 17.
22.
Elaine Pak Li, Lacklustre Films Made Public Turn to Fakes, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Mar. 19, 1999, at 4.
23.
See id. The respondents indicated that the poor quality of Hong Kong film is
what turns consumers on to the black market.
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consumers should not face criminal liability for purchasing such discs. 24
When Hong Kong consumers have made their voices heard, they have
not blamed piracy for declining cinema attendance, but the poor quality
of films shown and the uncomfortable surroundings of the theaters
themselves. 25 This dissatisfaction has contributed to the rising demand
for pirated, less expensive VCDs, and this problem has not gone
unnoticed by the HKSAR government.
B. The Legal Response
Hong Kong has long carried the regrettable reputation as an
underground market for counterfeit goods. Piracy of intellectual
property has become a booming business in Southeast Asia.2 6 In 1984, a
group of tourists complained to the Hong Kong Tourists Association that
they were unable to purchase the counterfeit goods they sought during
their trip. 27 Although those tourists may have sought any number of
different counterfeit products, one of the most prevalent items available
on the black market, as previously indicated, is copyright infringing
VCDs. 28 In fact, illegal VCDs of mainstream and category III movies are
some of the most ubiquitous products available in Hong Kong. 29 The
HKSAR government, however, has not stood idly by as this lamentable
situation developed. After all, Hong Kong prides itself as "the

24.
Id. The current Copyright Ordinance attempts to deter piracy by cracking
down on the manufacturers and the distributors. While this Note poses alternative
solutions to the very real problem the Ordinance addresses, this poll indicates that
attempts to shift the deterrence effort onto the consumer (rather than the
manufacturer) would fail. The current state of the Hong Kong economy and the lack of
consumer choice in entertainment suggests that shifting the deterrent onto the
consumer would prove as ineffective as current deterrence efforts. Thus, this Note does
not suggest any kind of deterrence theory as a solution to the piracy problem.
25.
See Will Lai, Cinema Slump-Piratesnot Solely to Blame, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Mar. 19, 1999, at 24. In a letter to the editor, a consumer vents his frustration
with the smoky, uncomfortable conditions in Hong Kong theaters, including those
operated by mainstream film distributors such as United Artists.
26.
Press Release, Software Alliance, BSC Survey Shows Software Piracy in
Asia Rose to 51% in 2000, with Half of all Asia Pacific Businesses Still Using Illegal
Software, at http://www.bsa.org/hongkong/press/newsreleases/30O5O1.phtml (stating
that Hong Kong's piracy rate increased to 57% in 2000).
27.
BANKOLE SODIPO, PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 149 (1997).

GATT TRIPS

AND

28.
See generally Davis, supra note 9, at 23. The author indicates that there are
many reasons for the rising popularity of illegal VCDs, including: the lack of quality
entertainment alternatives on television, the wide selection of VCDs, the low price of
black market VCDs, the privacy home VCD viewing offers as opposed to the local
cinema, and the availability of category III films in this format.
29.
Id; see also Li, supra note 22, at 4.
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embodiment of an open society whose economic well-being is based on
'30
free markets and high legal standards.
On June 27, 1997, the Hong Kong Legislative Counsel passed the
Copyright Ordinance. 31 The enactment of this legislation coincided with
the handover of Hong Kong to mainland China and was, in part, enacted
because China pledged, in a Joint Declaration with Great Britain, to
maintain for at least 50 years the free economy and laws previously
established by the British government. 32 Thus, the current Copyright
Ordinance is similar 3 3 to the previous British Film Censorship
Ordinance insofar as both laws regulate the film industry in Hong Kong,
but one can distinguish the new Ordinance 34 by the harsher penalties it

Madeleine Albright, High Stakes in HongKong: America Will Protectits own
30.
Interests and Support the Region's People Long After July 1, NEWSWEEK, June 23, 1997,
at 54.
See H.K. Ord. No. 92 (1997).
31.
See Trevor Stevens, Recent Trademark Developments: Asian/Pacific and
32.
Australia, in TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND

AUSTRALIA 1994 329, 342 (PLI/Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literacy Prop. Course
Handbook Series No. 393, 1994). This Joint Declaration established the "one country,
two systems" principle that China assured Britain would guide its relations with Hong
Kong.
33.
See generally Davis, supra note 9, at 20-22. For years the British operated a
system of "colonial censorship" in bad faith. Although the British government had no
authority to censor or restrict Hong Kong films, it initiated such a practice beginning in
1953 in an effort to censor films that might appear offensive to the Chinese mainland.
Between 1973 and 1987, the British banned 20 films because "they were thought to be
damaging to relations with China." Similarly, censorship persists under the current
Ordinance, but it has taken the post-colonial form "under what may be called an
'alternative Chineseness."' Ironically, one could argue that the British preoccupation
with China has manifested itself within category III films. Because the British did not
want to disturb the Mainland government, they used censorship laws to prevent any
direct criticism of China. Thus, category III films began to include subtle and implicit
attacks on the mainland, usually by making the antagonists of the films come from
China. See, e.g., INTRUDER, supra note 2.
34.
See H.K. Ord. No. 92 (1997). The relevant Section 118 of the Ordinance
establishes:
118. Criminal liability for making or dealing with infringing articles, etc.
(1) A person commits an offense if he, without the license of the copyright
owner(a) makes for sale or hire;
(b) imports into Hong Kong otherwise than for his private and domestic
use;
(c) exports from Hong Kong otherwise than for his private and domestic
use;
(d) possesses for the purpose of trade or business with a view to
committing any act infringing the copyright;
(e) for the purpose of trade or business-
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(i) sells or lets for hire:
(ii) offers or exposes for sale or hire;
(iii) exhibits in public; or
(iv) distributes; or

(0 distributes otherwise than for the purpose of trade or business to such
an extent as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright, an
infringing copy of a copyright work.
(2) Subsections (1)(b) and (c) and (4)(b) and (c) do not apply to an article in
transit.
(3) It is a defence for the person charged with an offence under subsection (1),
to prove that he did not know and had no reason to believe that the copy in
question was an infringing copy of the copyright work.
(4) A person commits an offence if he(a) makes;
(b) imports into Hong Kong;
(c) exports from Hong Kong;
(d) possesses; or
(e) sells or lets for hire, or offers or exposes for sale or hire, an article
specifically designed or adapted for making copies of a particular
copyright work which article is used or intended to be used to make
infringing copies of the copyright work for sale or hire or for use for the
purpose of trade or business.
(5) It is a defence for the person charged with an offence under subsection (4)
to prove that he did not know and had no reason to believe that the article
was used or was intended to be used to make the infringing copies for sale or
hire or for use the purpose of trade or business.
(6) For the purpose of subsections (1)(b) and (3), where a person is charged
with an offence under subsection (1) in respect of a copy of a copyright work
which is an infringing copy by virtue only of subsection 35(3) and not being
excluded under section 35(4), if he proves that(a) he had made reasonable enquiries sufficient to satisfy himself that the
copy in question was not an infringing copy of the work;
(b) he had reasonable grounds to be satisfied in the circumstances of the
case that the copy was not an infringing copy;
(c) there were no other circumstances which would have led him
reasonably to suspect that the copy was an infringing copy, he has proved
that he had no reason to believe that the copy in question was an
infringing copy of the copyright work.
(7) In determining whether the person charged has proved under subsection
(6) that he had no reason to believe that the copy in question was in
infringing copy of the work, the court may have regard to, including but not
limited to, the following-
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has enacted against people guilty of violating the provisions concerning
35
manufacturing or distribution.
The British 1956 Copyright Act remained in place until the British
enacted the 1988 Copyright Act and the Designs and Patents Act,
36
although the 1956 Act continued as part of the Hong Kong body of law.
With the transition back to the mainland and the advancements in
digital reproduction technology, however, the Legislative Counsel
decided, in November 1996, to pursue the new Copyright Ordinance to
fight the piracy threat.3 7 Proponents of the Ordinance argued that it
would better protect product licensing, manufacturing, and distribution
rights. Some of the most vocal proponents of the bill were members of
the entertainment and film industries in Hong Kong. 38 Although the
proponents argued in favor of a stronger law with harsher penalties,
there remained similarities between the Ordinance and the 1956 Act.
Specifically, the Ordinance maintained the same definition of
"infringing copy. ''39 Infringing copies are imported into or produced in
Hong Kong and the infringement must be of a copyright or a breach of

(a) whether he had made enquiries with a relevant trade body in respect
of that category of work;
(b) whether he had given any notice drawing attention of the copyright
owner or exclusive licensee to his interest to import and to sell the copy of
the work;
(c) whether he had complied with any code of practice that may exist in
respect of the supply of that category of work;
(d) whether the response, if any, to those enquiries made by the defendant
was reasonable and timely;
(e) whether he was provided with the name, address and contact details of
the copyright owner or exclusive licensee (as the case may be);
(f)whether he was provided with the date of first day of publication of the
work;
(g) whether he was provided with proof of any relevant exclusive license.
(8) A person commits an offence if he has in his possession an article knowing
or having reason to believe that it is used or is intended to be used to make
infringing copies of any copyright work for sale or hire or for use for the
purpose of trade or business.
(9) Sections 115 to 117 (presumptions as to various matters connected with
copyright) do not apply to proceedings for an offence under this section.
See infra Part II.
35.
36.
See Kristi Heim, Distributors,RetailersBattle Over Ban on ParallelImports,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 16, 1997 (H.K. Week), at 1.
37.
See id.
See generally Winnie Chung, Empty Houses Empty Future, S. CHINA
38.
MORNING POST, Mar. 21, 1999, at 1.
39.
See H.K. Ord. No. 92 35(1-4) (1997).
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an exclusive licensing agreement. 40 Diverging from the 1956 Act,
however, the new Ordinance sets the maximum penalties available in a
criminal or civil prosecution at imprisonment for up to four years and a
HK $50,000 (USD $6410) fine. 4 1 Furthermore, these penalties are
available for each individual violation of the Ordinance. 4 2 In addition to
these harsher penalties, the new Ordinance also makes available
defences not readily available under the 1956 Act. 43 Most notably, a
44
defendant can argue lack of knowledge, and thus intent, as a defense.
Despite this available defense, however, the case law will show that the
new Copyright Ordinance has proved harsher in language and
45
application than the older versions of the statute.
While many people favored this harsher law, including local film
producers, perhaps the most outspoken and powerful proponent was the
transnational film and entertainment industry. 46 One report indicates
that the U.S. film industry lost $78 million in revenue between 1995 and
1998 in Hong Kong because of piracy. 47 The vice-chairman of the Motion
Picture Industry Association stated that revenue from U.S. films
dropped 50 percent between 1992 and 1999.48 As a result, U.S. film
distributors maintained that copyright infringing VCDs caused fewer
films to open in Hong Kong and those films that did open grossed
substantially less revenue because the underground VCD market took
away potential customers. 49 Illegal VCDs sell for a fraction of the cost of
a cinema ticket and often a film can be found on the VCD black market
even before it reaches Hong Kong theaters. 50 Industry experts argue

40.
See H.K. Ord. No. 92 35(4).
41.
See H.K. Ord. No. 92 119.
42.
See generally id.
43.
See H.K. Ord. No. 92 118(1).
44.
See H.K. Ord. No. 92 118(5).
45.
See infra Part II.
46.
See Alison Morr, Hong Kong's Copyright Ordinance:How the Ban on Parallel
Imports Affects the U.S. Entertainment Industry and Hong Kong's Free Market, 21
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 393, 403 (1999); see Li, supra note 19, at 1; see generally
SODIPO, supra note 27, at 163 (discussing southeast Asia more generally, and not Hong
Kong specifically, the author acknowledges that the movement toward stronger
intellectual property laws throughout this region is the result of trade pressure brought
to bear by more developed countries); See also Thomas N. O'Neill, III, Intellectual
PropertyProtectionin Thailand:Asia's Young Tiger and America's "Growing"Concern,
11 U. PA. J. INT'L. Bus. L. 603, 604-05 (1990).

47.
See International Intellectual Property Alliance, at http://www.iipa.com/rbc/
1999/rbchong-kong_301._99.html. These figures represented a growing trend of VCD
piracy. The total amount lost in 1998, $30 million, represented a 50% increase over the
dollar amount lost in 1997.
48.
Jo Pegg, Threat of Movie Embargo, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 19, 1999,
availableat 1999 WL 33577977. Revenues slumped from $800 million in 1992 to $400
million in 1999.
49.
See Li, supra note 22, at 1.
50.
The typical VCD costs two to three dollars. See supra note 47; see also
Davis, supra note 9, at 23.
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that one in five U.S. film releases is available on the illegal black
market. 51 Furthermore, they contend that the VCDs damaged their
revenue on the aftermarket because legitimate Hong Kong VCD, VHS,
and DVD distributors are less likely to pay for the rights to films that
the underground market has already made available even before
52
cinemas presented the film in theaters.
Perhaps most important to the HKSAR government is the negative
image film piracy has created overseas. The impact can be felt beyond
the film industry. As Lam-Yuk Wah, a Hong Kong film industry official,
lamented, "I don't think people would want to invest here, and they'd
have second thoughts about bringing new information technology into
Hong Kong" as a result of the film piracy problem. 53 These arguments
and the industry forces bringing this pressure to bear were the main
reasons Hong Kong enacted a new Copyright Ordinance in 1997. The
practical results of this Ordinance and its impact on Hong Kong society,
however, did not become evident until the past few years.

II. CASE LAW
At the urging of transnational film industries, Hong Kong enacted
the Copyright Ordinance, in large part, to deter individuals or
businesses from manufacturing or distributing VCDs in violation of
intellectual property norms.
The Legislature, however, left the
interpretation of the statute to the courts. Consequently, since 1999, the
courts of Hong Kong have rigidly enforced these laws and the penalties
in particular. A pattern has emerged in the past few years: customs
officials conduct a raid, seize legal and illegal products, the defendants
are found guilty, and the court interprets the law so as not to allow
mitigating factors to affect rigid sentencing. In other words, the courts
are enforcing strictly what the Legislature intended as a deterrent.

51.
See supra note 47.
52.
See Li, supra note 22, at 1. In this regard, the widespread availability of
illegal VCDs is shown to have a wide-ranging economic impact across Hong Kong.
Nevertheless, the widespread availability of the VCDs also suggests that the current
problem in Hong Kong is one of supply, not demand.
53.
See Pegg, supra note 48.
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A. The Initial JudicialInterpretationsof the Law in Support of
Deterrence
The effort at deterrence is evident not only in the language of the
statute, but also in the language courts have used to explain and to
enforce the law. Hong Kong courts have made clear that they consider
the Copyright Ordinance to be an important part of the legal effort to
deter infringements on intellectual property. Toward that end, the
courts have interpreted the language of the Ordinance broadly and in
favor of law enforcement. Under the prevailing interpretation, officers of
the Customs and Excise Department have far-reaching power to seize
property and the court, to further this effort at deterrence, has
established a less-than-reasonable standard that officers must meet to
ensure the legality of any seizures. As a result of the courts reading a
low threshold requirement into the law, parties accused of violating the
ordinance have argued that the law allows officers to exceed their
authority and that the law is a disguised effort to shut down legal as well
as illegal operations, but these arguments have not met with success in
any Hong Kong court.
The fact that the Legislature intended the Copyright Ordinance to
act as a deterrent became evident throughout the early cases addressing
the Ordinance. Courts have made it clear that they will enforce longer
prison sentences in an effort to strengthen the deterrent value of the
Copyright Ordinance. In HKSAR v. Lee Kong, a man convicted of selling
copyright-infringing VCDs petitioned the appellate court to reduce his
sentence from imprisonment to community service. 54 In December 1998,
the appellant pled guilty to violations of the Copyright Ordinance
stemming from the sale of 992 copyright-infringing VCDs. 5 5 The
magistrate sentenced him to three months imprisonment. 56 The
appellant's counsel argued before the magistrate that his client had only
agreed to work in the shop where officials arrested him because he could
not find another job. 57 On that basis, counsel requested community
service as punishment, but the magistrate instead sent the appellant to
prison. 58

54.
HKSAR v. Lee Kong, [1999] HKEC 1004 (High Court of the HKSAR
Appellate Jurisdiction, Apr. 22, 1999), available at 1999 WL 3357797.

55.
56.

Id.
Id.

57.
Id. at 2. This mitigating circumstance is a prevalent argument in
prosecutions of employees of distributors. Often, as here, the defendant pleads
economic hardship and necessity as mitigating factors. The court has rejected this plea,
but this contention is important in the final deterrence analysis because it suggests
that many defendants, such as Lee Kong, are not of rational mind when committing this
crime.
58.
Id.
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After making essentially the same argument at the appellate level,
the court recounted the history of the Copyright Ordinance and extolled
how the levels of fines and imprisonment had steadily increased through
the years, culminating with the present-day penalties5 9 contained in the
HKSAR Ordinance. 60 Specifically, the Court enumerated that HKSAR
courts in the past and present imposed prison sentences "in order to
stamp out this illegal activity.. . ."61 The purpose of the Ordinance "was
62
to protect Hong Kong's reputation as a fair international trade centre."
In a continuation of this trend, the court in Lee Kong acknowledged that
"the sentences passed by the Courts had been more severe as offences of
this nature had become more prevalent" 63 and that it had "no doubt that
this is the proper approach ...1"64 The court summarized the prevailing
judicial attitude toward these VCD counterfeiters by stating that it "is
just proper that immediate custodial sentence be passed as a deterrent
for the offence which has become prevalent and the message from these
Courts is that such an offence will be dealt with severely."65 Ultimately,
however, in this case the court decided to order a community service
report to consider alternative sentencing for the appellant, but only
because the court recognized that the appellant had spent much time
abroad and the deterrent value of the Ordinance would be ineffective
66
against individuals not recognizing the severity of their crimes.
Nevertheless, the court clearly demonstrated its commitment to
deterrence in this case.
The legality of the seizure in Lee Kong was not an issue and with
good reason. Precedent did not favor the defendant. To further facilitate

59.
Id. The HKSAR raised the levels of fines and imprisonment to $50,000 and
four years, respectively.
60.
See id.
Id. at 3. The court's language is emblematic of a law aimed at deterrence.
61.
62.
Id. This justification for the law suggests, at the very least, that the
Legislature was aware of transnational trade factors when passing the law.
63.
Id. The court essentially argues that there is a proportionate relationship
between prevalence of piracy and attempts to deter that activity through harsher
penalties.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
66.
See generally id. at 5. The court acknowledged that community service
sentencing is available in Hong Kong if the applicant avails himself of six conditions
and the court found that the appellant might meet these conditions. However, the court
stated that it was giving the appellant "the benefit of the doubt" because he was not
familiar with the laws and situation in Hong Kong after spending many years in Spain.
Thus, the court only granted the possibility of an alternative sentence because the
deterrent of imprisonment was ineffective against an individual who did not realize he
was breaking the law. Living abroad, there was no way Hong Kong could publicize the
law to this particular defendant. The court specifically declared that this case was of an
"exceptional nature" and the strong language supporting the Ordinance as a deterrent
suggests that the court was only carving out a narrow exception to the rigid
enforcement of this law.
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the effort at deterrence, courts have imposed a very low threshold
requirement on officers attempting to seize VCDs. One of the largest
raids of the Sino Centre in 1998 resulted in a prominent opportunity for
the High Court to demonstrate the legal system's commitment to
deterrence and clarify the broad powers of officers acting to enforce the
Ordinance. 67 Not surprisingly, the court began its decision in Wong Chi
Yin Andy et al. v. Commissioner of Customs and Excise by noting that
the Sino Centre on Nathan Road had become a vast market for
counterfeit discs. 68 Thus, from the first sentence of the decision, the
court affirmed that the judicial system, and this court particularly,
recognized the growing problem of illegal counterfeits. 69 The Customs
and Excise Department had targeted the Sino Centre as early as 1997
because many individuals "are selling counterfeit video compact discs...
of television programmes and other works from Japan. '70 Thus, on
September 10, 1998 Customs officials raided 26 shops in the Centre and
71
seized "many thousands" of VCDs.
72
The three applicants in this case owned some of the raided shops.
73
Customs officials seized 11,125 VCDs in total from the three shops. Of
these 11,125 VCDs, 6,120 of them contained copyrighted Japanese
television programs. 7 4 Based on these facts, the prosecution decided to
pursue both criminal charges and forfeiture proceedings against the
applicants. 75 In their defense, the applicants did not dispute the facts,
76
but focused on the validity of the underlying law that justified the raid.
They argued that "the Customs and Excise Department has exceeded the
wide powers given to it to combat the war against copyright piracy. ' 77

67.
Wong Chi Yin Andy v. Comm'r of Customs and Excise, 1999 284 HKCU 1
(High Court of the HKSAR, Feb. 12, 1999).
68.
Id. This conclusion, however, is not supported by any facts presented in this
case. Apparently, the Court seems to accept the fact that the Sino Centre is a hotbed of
illegal VCD activity simply because the police have targeted the area as such. While
the Court's conclusion is reasonable, it is still not supported by any data.
69.
Cf. id.
70.
Id.
71.
Id. Although the number of illegal VCDs seized suggests that this raid was
a large one, there is still no data to suggest that on a daily basis there is this kind of
illegal activity in the Sino Centre.
72.
Id.
73.
Id. at 3.
74.
Id. The remaining VCDs consisted of plays, films, cartoons, and other
recordings. There was no evidence that they infringed any copyrights or that they were
Japanese in origin.
75.
Id. at 4-5.
76.
See id. at 1-2.
77.
Id. Although this case came before the court two years after the passage of
the Ordinance, there still remained many legal questions of interpretation that no court
had yet answered in regard to the Ordinance. Most of these yet unanswered questions
in 1999 concerned the extent of the police powers granted by the Ordinance and the
length of sentencing available to individuals convicted under the statute.
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Furthermore, the applicants argued that Customs was acting upon a
"hidden agenda" to shut down all VCD sellers in the Centre, regardless
of whether or not the products were counterfeit or genuine. 78 The court
did not agree with any arguments of the applicants and held in favor of
Customs. 79
The court explained the large grant of power the Copyright
Ordinance gives Customs officials and the court elucidated a very low
threshold to justify Customs' seizure of discs.80 The court specifically
noted that the Ordinance "empowers such an officer to 'seize, remove
and detain.., any article which appears to him to be an infringing copy
of a copyright work."'81 The court then explained that an article can
appearto be an infringing copy if the article was "held to have appeared
to be likely to be evidence of an offence if the officers believed that they
were likely to be relied on as evidence in proceedings for an offence
under Part II of the Ordinance to prove that such an offence had been
committed. '8 2 The court further explained that
[T]he threshold which has to be overcome is much lower than that the
belief has to be reasonable. That is apparent from the structure of section
122(1). Section 122(1)(a) expressly requires the suspicion to be reasonable
before premises may be entered or vessels and aircraft may be boarded or
vehicles may be stopped for the purposes of searching them. The
requirement of reasonableness in section 122(1)(b) is conspicuous by its
83
absence.

Later decisions upheld this low threshold standard for seizing property
84
and it has became an accepted legal standard in VCD seizure cases.
Based on this interpretation of the Ordinance, the court in this case
looked to the evidence and determined that the officers were justified in

78.
Id.
79.
See id. at 1.
80.
Id.
81.
Id. at 2 (emphasis added). This interpretation of the threshold requirement
is the generally-accepted view of Hong Kong courts today. The important precedent can
be traced to this case that many courts continue to cite.
82.
Id. at 6-7.
83.
Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
84.
See generally Comm'r of Customs and Excise v. Golden Sci. Tech. Ltd. &
ORS, 1999-4 HKC 169 (Court of Appeal, Aug. 20, 1999). In this appeal concerning a
separate issue, the court reiterated that the Copyright Ordinance Section 122(1)(b)
authorizes an officer to
seize, remove or detain, not only any article which appears to him to be an
infringing copy of a copyright work as well as any article which is specifically
designed or intended to be used for making such a copy, but also anything which
appears to him to be or to contain or to be likely to contain evidence of an
offence.
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seizing all of the discs and that their actions, thus, were lawful. 85 The
court found that shortly before the raid, two delegations of Japanese
television officials visited Hong Kong and purchased on the black market
VCDs of their Japanese programs.8 6 These visitors confirmed that they
had not granted a license to produce these copyrighted works and that
they believed every VCD "in the market" was infringing on their
Consequently, the court found that the
intellectual property.8 7
information supplied by the Japanese delegations "provided some
foundation for the belief of the officers who authorized their seizure that
all the VCDs and DVDs which were seized were Japanese television
programmes, and were therefore infringing copies ....*"88 The court
concluded that there "can be no doubt what[so]ever that there is some
foundation for the belief that the 6,120 VCDs... which feature Japanese
television series are infringing copies." 89
After explaining the low threshold requirement and concluding that
the Customs officers met that threshold in Wong, the court briefly
addressed the '"hidden agenda" argument. 90 The applicants claimed that
Customs was carrying out an illegal agenda to shut down retail
businesses in the Sino Centre, regardless of whether the retailers sold
legal or illegal discs. 91 They argued that the Customs officials had no
intention of ever returning any of the seized merchandise, including the
legal merchandise that did not infringe any copyrights, and that the
officials seized everything whether they believed the discs to be
infringing or not. 9 2 The applicants even went so far in their Notice of
Application to request that the court declare "this 'policy' was
unlawful" 93 because Section 122 of the Ordinance created "powers of
entry and search, seizure and detention . . .exercised for a collateral
purpose, and that rendered unlawful what might otherwise have
94
amounted to the lawful seizure and detention of the articles."

85.
See Wong Chi Yin Andy. v. Comm'r of Customs and Excise, 1999 284 HKCU
1 (High Court of the HKSAR, Feb. 12, 1999).
86.
Id. at 10.
87.
Id.
88.
See id. at 12-13.
89.
Id. at 14. The language of the court is revealing. Requiring a bare
minimum standard for the basis of seizure has resulted in sweeping authority for the
Customs department. Conceivably, the department could seize and hold thousands of
legally-produced VCDs on the basis that merely a few discs may violate copyright laws.
The fact that the legislature has not amended the Ordinance to rescind or clarify this
interpretation is tantamount to tacit consent.
See id. at 21.
90.
91.
See id. The defendants never provided any reasonable explanation for why
government officials would want to close down the legal businesses as well as the illegal
ones.

92.

See id.

93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 23.
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The court rejected this hidden agenda argument by applying the
same threshold requirement used to justify the initial seizure. 95 Based
on the facts, 96 the court reasoned that the officials had a justifiable basis
for believing that the works infringed on copyrights and, thus, that
belief, not a hidden agenda, motivated their raid and seizure of the
thousands of VCDs. 97 Furthermore, the Court held that there was not
sufficient evidence for the hidden agenda argument because the "fact
that all the Applicants' VCDs and DVDs were seized and detained is just
as consistent with the belief that they were infringing copies as it is with
98
the desire to close down the Applicant's businesses."
Although the low threshold requirement for seizing VCDs appears
to have set a dangerous precedent, the court, in the month following
Wong,eliminated any lingering doubts that the justice system and the
government were working in a tandem to further a hidden agenda when
the court granted protective relief to the respondents in Commissioner of
Customs & Excise v. Golden Science Technology Ltd.99 In this case, the
Customs department pursued criminal charges against the respondent
owners of plants designed to manufacture VCDs. 100 Following a raid
that uncovered the illegal duplication of copyrighted works, the Customs
department decided to detain the VCD machinery inside the plant and
post guards on the premises so the respondents could not enter and use
the production facilities. 1° 1 Customs denied the respondents access to
their plants, in part, because they feared that the respondents may
damage or remove evidence that Customs required for the upcoming

95.
See id. at 22-23. Additionally, by looking at the issue in a transnational
context that extends beyond Hong Kong laws, one can see that the hidden agenda
argument is logically flawed. Both domestic and transnational film distributors profit
from the legal sale of VCDs in Hong Kong. The argument that the intent of the
Ordinance, as argued unsuccessfully in this case, is to close down all storefronts selling
legal and illegal VCDs ignores the basic facts that the transnational film community
has applied pressure to the HKSAR government to protect the legal trade of VCDs, and
thereby the profits derived from legal sales, by clamping down on the black market. If
it truly were the government's intent to crackdown on all VCDs, it could accomplish this
goal much more readily by simply banning the sale of VCDs in Hong Kong rather than
going through the ardorous steps of passing a law with a hidden agenda.
96.
The court primarily relied on its already-reached conclusion that the
Customs officials were justified in their belief that all the VCDs they found were
infringing copies.
97.
Wong Chi Yin Andy, 1999 284 HKCU at 22.
98.
Id. at 23. The court most likely reached the appropriate conclusion with
regard to this hidden agenda argument. Although the sweeping authority this
Ordinance grants the Customs department does not present the possibility of abuse or
selective enforcement, this case seems to present only an example of zealous
enforcement.
99.
Comm'r of Customs & Excise v. Golden Sci. Tech. Ltd., 1999 344 HKCU 1
(High Court of the HKSAR, Mar. 26, 1999).
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
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criminal trial. 10 2 The respondents, however, argued that they needed
access to their plants and machinery so they could continue their legal
keep the company solvent until the
VCD manufacturing business and
10 4
date 10 3 of their criminal trial.
The court recognized the competing interests of both Customs (the
public interest) and the respondents and concluded that the respondents
should have access to their plants. 10 5 The court acknowledged that
Section 190(1) of the Copyright Ordinance allows the respondents to sue
the government for any damages resulting from unlawful detention of
their property, 10 6 but the court reasoned that this protection, "a possible
civil claim against the Government in some distant future," would not
help a company that has gone out of business during the interim
between seizure and criminal trial.' 0 7 Thus, the court allowed the
respondents to re-enter their plants, subject to certain safeguards to
protect evidence for future trials.10 8 On appeal, the higher court held in
favor of Golden Science on the same grounds and enumerated that the
court had the power to establish "temporary arrangements" to resolve
pending disputes over seized property. 10 9
While the decision in Golden Science may have granted a small
victory to defendants in copyright violation cases, the fact remains that
Hong Kong courts, through their interpretation of the Ordinance, have
created a law where the goal of deterrence trumps all other
considerations. The language of these early cases revealed the courts'
desire to enforce a strong deterrent and to allow the government broad
power to seize property. The result is a strict law that despite its best
efforts has not achieved its goal: to deter copyright infringements.
Despite the rigid enforcement of the Ordinance in these early decisions,
defendants still have access to statutory defenses and sentencing
arguments, but these avenues have proved generally unfruitful.

102.
Id. at 6. Customs decided to prosecute the respondents for criminal
violations of the Copyright Ordinance.
103.
There seems to be some dispute as to when the respondents would face the
criminal charges. Customs seized the plants and machinery, but waited almost six
months before charging the respondents with violations of the Copyright Ordinance.
The parties to this case acknowledged that it would be at least six months, perhaps
longer, before the criminal trial ever came before a court. See id. at 2-3.
104.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 10.
105.
106.
Id.
107.
Id. at 12.
108.
Id. at 12-13.
109.
See Comm'r of Customs and Excise v. Golden Sci. Tech. Ltd., 1999-4 HKC
169 (Court of Appeal, Aug. 20, 1999), available at 1999 HKC Lexis 315. The power of
the courts to erect temporary arrangements is important beyond the scope of this case
because it also establishes a precedent through which future courts can avoid
unfavorable precedent by creating temporary arrangements that are distinguished
merely by small differences in fact from the facts in the precedential cases.
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B. Available Defenses
The Copyright Ordinance offers the accused a statutory defense to
the mens rea element. If the defendant can prove that he did not know,
or had no reason to know, that the works he had reproduced infringed on
copyrights, then that defendant may avoid the penalties of the
Ordinance. However, a defendant is unlikely to succeed arguing this
defense because Hong Kong courts have interpreted this defense very
narrowly.
Section 118(3) and (5) provide a defense for persons who did not
know or had no reason to know that the works, they had produced
infringed on copyrights. 110 Nevertheless, as the court in HKSAR v.
Mega Laser ProductsLtd. & ORS made clear, violations of the Copyright
Ordinance are strict liability offenses and the defenses are thus subject
to a high objective standard to argue and prove successfully."' In Mega
Laser, the government charged and convicted the appellants of three
violations of the Copyright Ordinance for making for sale infringing
copies, for being in possession of articles designed to make copies of
copyrighted works, and for "being in possession of an article used or
intended to be used to make infringing copies of any copyright work and
the particulars of the offence contain particulars of the plant and
equipment in question which comprised the components of the
production line."1 12 A Taiwan-based company, Cheung Ying, had
approached Mega Laser to produce VCDs of the Walt Disney films "The
Lady and the Tramp," "101 Dalmatians," "Alice in Wonderland," "Peter
Pan," and "The Sword in the Stone. 11 3 Following a Customs
Department raid and a criminal trial, the court convicted all three
defendants of Copyright Ordinance violations on all three grounds. 1 4 At
its trial, Mega Laser argued the defenses available under Section 188,
subsections (3) and (5), and contended that it only sought to distribute
the VCDs in Taiwan to Cheung Ying, but the trial judge held that the
defendants had a duty "to make reasonable inquiries whether the films
produced by them infringed copyright in Hong Kong."1 15 Consequently,

110.
See H.K. Ord. 92, 35 (1-4).
111.
HKSAR v. Mega Laser Prod. Ltd., [19991 HKEC 1100 (Court of Appeal, June
10, 1999), available at 1999 WL 33578066.
112.
Id.
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
Id.
The court never defines what type of inquiry would satisfy the
reasonableness requirement. Instead, the court merely recites the argument that to
allow copyright infringers to pass the buck and argue that they believed someone else
had checked the copyright status of the work amounts to bad policy. While the court
may be correct that allowing infringers to pass the buck is bad policy, the court should
garner little sympathy because it is equally poor policy to outline a reasonableness
standard without defining the context of reasonableness in this situation.
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the defendants' inquiries into the copyright status could never be
reasonable because they "failed to take into account the law of Hong
Kong .... "116
On appeal, Mega Laser argued that the trial judge erred as a matter
of law in reaching both conclusions. 117 The Court of Appeals upheld the
trial judge, first noting that "offences under ss 118(1)(a) and (4)(d) are
strict liability offences" 118 and that the trial judge did not err as a matter
of law. 1 19 The court initially examined whether the trial judge erred in
holding that the Copyright Ordinance "imposed upon the Appellants a
duty to make reasonable inquiries whether the films produced by them
infringed copyright in Hong Kong."'120 The court agreed with the trial
judge's reasoning that because Mega Laser was
manufacturing copies of an artistic work in Hong Kong, the reasonable
steps which the defendants could have taken was to make enquiries
through normal channels in Hong Kong about the state of the copyright in
121
the Disney titles. In the event [the third defendant] took no such steps,
so he did not meet the standards of statutory defence available under
subsections (3) and (5) ....122

The appellants argued that because the trial judge recognized the
films as "artistic works," then they had no reason, as lay people, to
consider any copyright implications flowing from such works. 123 The
Court of Appeals disagreed and recounted the history of the Copyright
Ordinance, 124stating that the Ordinance covered "drawings" and
"cartoons."
Thus, the trial judge correctly referred to the films as
12 5
artistic works.
Furthermore, the court explained that defendants
must make inquiries themselves and cannot rely on the statements of
others, in this case Cheung Ying. 126 The court reasoned that for the
statutory defense to succeed, the defendants must make their own
reasonable investigations somewhere along the line and that it is
incumbent upon anyone who proposes to make use of any artistic work in
a way which might infringe copyright, if it subsisted in the work, to make

116.
Id.
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
Id.
121.
See id. Mega Laser inquired Cheung Ying about the state of the copyrights
in Taiwan, but did not make any inquiries about the state of the copyrights in Hong
Kong.
122.
Id.
123.
Id. Although the court did not seize upon it, this argument by the
defendants is inconsistent with the facts. If they truly were lay people without
knowledge of copyrights, then they would not have asked Cheung Ying about the status
of the copyrights in Taiwan.
124.

Id.

125.
126.

Id.
See id.
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such inquiries and investigation as he reasonably can to satisfy himself
that the work is free of copyright. No doubt every case must depend upon
its own particular facts, but if no adequate inquiries or investigations are
made, it must.., be difficult to suppose that the person proposing to use
the work has no grounds for suspecting that it must be subject to
12 7
copyright.

The appellants next argued that the trial judge erred in finding that
"an inquiry made by the defendants, which failed to take into account
the law of Hong Kong, could never be reasonable.' 128 Instead of making
inquiries as to the state of the copyrights in Hong Kong, the appellants
checked their status in Taiwan. 129 The Court of Appeals, however,
illustrated that the appellants gave no reason why inquiring about the
copyrights in Taiwan should assist them in complying with Hong Kong
law and, furthermore, because Mega Laser was making the copies in
Hong Kong it was "undoubtedly necessary for the applicants to comply
with the law of Hong Kong."'130 After examining the transcripts of the
trial, the court concluded that the appellants made only "minimal
efforts" to ensure their compliance with the Hong Kong Copyright
Ordinance. 13 1 Thus, the court upheld the convictions against the
appellants and they could not avail themselves of the enumerated
132
defenses.
The holding of Mega Laser was implicitly challenged one year later
by the appellant in HKSAR v. Tan Say Seng. 133 In this case, a
magistrate convicted the appellant of violating the Copyright Ordinance
by importing 10,000 copyright-infringing VCDs. 134 The appellant was
the manager of the Hong Kong company Summit, a VCD manufacturer,
and received the VCDs from its Singapore associates. 135 Customs
searched the shipment upon its arrival and discovered 10,000 VCDs that
infringed on Polygram copyrights. 136 The appellant had, however,

127.
Id.
128.
Id.
129.
Id.
130.
Id. Here the court establishes that the reach of the Copyright Ordinance
stretches beyond VCDs to be sold on Hong Kong streets. Arguably in deference to
transnational trade interests, the court establishes that the mere production of VCDs
that violate Hong Kong copyright licenses, even if only manufactured for sale outside
Hong Kong, comes within the scope of the Ordinance.
131.
Id. On a related subject, the transcript from the trial reveals that the
defendant was aware of Hong Kong's piracy problem and the laws designed to crack
down on it. At the very least, this record indicates that the law has been publicized yet
copyright infringements continue to be a serious problem. Thus, this exchange relates
the ineffectiveness of the law's deterrence.
132.
Id.
133.
HKSAR v. Tan Say Seng, [2000] 3 HKC 236 (Court of Appeal, June 30,
2000), available at 2000 HKC Lexis 201.
134.
Id.
135.
Id.
136.
Id.
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received a Certificate of License to Copy from its mainland China
agent. 13 7 Normally, this licensing process authorizes a company or
individual to make duplications of copyrighted works.13 8 In this case,
139
however, the received license was insufficient.
At trial, the defendant relied upon the Section 118(3) defense,
arguing that he did not know and had no reason to know that the copy in
question was an infringing copy because he had received what he
honestly believed to be an official license. 140 He argued that it was
reasonable to rely on the veracity of the license even though the license
did not indicate the date of delivery, the date of the signing by the
publisher's authorized signatory, or the identity number and telephone
number of the authorized signatory.'14 According to the defendant, such
omissions on these forms were common. 142 The court disagreed and
43
found him guilty.'
On appeal, the defendant raised four grounds for error. 144 First, he
argued that the magistrate incorrectly interpreted the Section 118(3)
defense by applying a subjective test for the "did not know" first limb
and an objective test for the "had no reason to believe" second limb
rather than applying a subjective test to both. 145 The magistrate
accepted that the defendant did not know that the VCDs were infringing,
but he required "the defence to show, on an objective standard, that the
copyright enquiries the appellant made were adequate .... ,"146 The
magistrate conceded that the defendant need not engage in the same
level of diligence as the Customs Department often does in tracking
down infringing copies, but the standard "must mean such diligence as
an ordinarily prudent and diligent man would exercise under the
circumstances of his case."1 47 The Court of Appeals agreed with this

137.
Id.
138.
See id. The International Federation of Phonographic Industry (IFPI) deals
with sound recording copyrights in Hong Kong. In 1997, the organization established a
system whereby those persons placing orders in optical disc plants could check to see if
they had the permission of the copyright owners to make duplications. Summit,
however, through its Chinese agent, instead obtained a Certificate of License to Copy,
but made no copyright inquiry in Hong Kong.
139.
Id.
140.
See id.
141.
Id. The omissions are typically included on such licenses.
142.
See id.
143.
Id.
144.
145.
146.

Id.

Id.
Id.
147.
Id. When compared to the relatively low threshold required for customs to
seize VCDs, this higher "ordinary prudent man" standard reveals that the Ordinance
places heavier burdens on defendants rather than the prosecution. Arguably, there is
almost a presumption that raids are legally conducted when there is any basis for
seizure, but here the court applies a much higher standard to negate mens rea.
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the
standard and deemed the magistrate correct in finding that
148
appellant's inquiries were insufficient under the circumstances.
Next, the appellant argued that the magistrate erred because under
either standard, any reasonable man would have accepted the License
Certificate as genuine. 149 He argued that the errors on the certificate
were common and that the magistrate, thus, should not have expected
him to make inquiries in Hong Kong because he reasonably relied on the
150
commission's license to grant him authority to make duplications.
This reliance was reasonable, he contended, because "[wihen one deals
with a country where the system is communist and everything is
regulated by the State Authorities, there are no further enquiries to
make once the certificate is issued."'15 1 The Court of Appeals agreed with
the magistrate that reliance on the certificate may be reasonable on the
mainland, but not in Hong Kong because of the license's "inherent
1 52
weaknesses".
The most obvious weakness, the court declared, was that these
certificates "are documents produced in the mainland to govern
Mainland practices relating to the copying of goods,"'1 53 and although
they may provide the necessary protection for people relying on them in
China, they "cannot offer the same protection so far as Hong Kong legal
requirements are concerned."'1 4 The court also acknowledged other
dangers in relying on the certificates, such as the fact that Press and
Publications Administration (PPA) procedures for issuing the license are
not subject to any oversight in Hong Kong. 1 55 Furthermore, because the
PPA relies on the applicant to supply information about the current
holder of the copyright on the submitted work, there is no evidence that
the PPA engages in an independent system of checks to ensure the
honesty of the applicants. 15 6 Finally, the court believed that the PPA
that material copied
licensing process may actually only be "to ensure 157
meets censorship requirements" on the Mainland.
Next, the appellant argued that he was not subject to the Mega
Laser requirement that the defendant make inquiries in Hong Kong
158
even though he was producing the VCDs for a foreign market.
Instead, the appellant contended that he was subject to the rule in

148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.

151.

Id.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Megabyte Magnetic IndustrialCo., 159 where the court established "that it
was not necessary to make copyright enquiries in Hong Kong as long as
sufficient enquiries had been made.' 160 The appellant conceded that
Mega Laser is unclear as to whether a person must make inquiries in
Hong Kong as a precondition for availing himself of the statutory
defense, but he argued that the court in this case should not adopt such
161
a standard.
The court disagreed and found no basis to distinguish Mega Laser
from Megabyte Magnetic.162 The court reasoned that under the rules
established by either case, a court must consider an argument "according
to its particular facts and, depending on those facts, enquiries and
investigation that can be regarded as sufficient must be made."'1 63 In
Megabyte Magnetic, the court only allowed the defendant to argue the
defense without having first made inquiries in Hong Kong because the
"particular circumstances" of the case gave the defendant no reason
to
doubt the veracity of the inquiries he had made outside of Hong Kong.164
In Mega Laser, the court also established that reasonable inquiries were
established based on the facts of the case and because the defendant in
that case was manufacturing the VCDs in Hong Kong, that fact justified
making inquiries in Hong Kong. 165 Mega Laser did not provide authority
for the proposition that there must always be an inquiry in Hong Kong,
but rather, as in this case, there must be an inquiry if the manufacturing
is to take place in Hong Kong. 166 Thus, under that interpretation of the
case law, the Court of Appeals concluded that the magistrate reviewed
the facts appropriately, and held that the incomplete certificate
combined with the fact that the defendant was a manufacturer in the
167
HKSAR necessitated making inquiries in Hong Kong.
Finally, the appellant argued that the magistrate's oral reasoning
for the verdict contradicted the written assessment of the facts and the
decision should, thus, be thrown out. 168 Specifically, the magistrate
indicated orally that a key defense witness, Chow Ming, struck him as
dishonest and unreliable, yet the magistrate later wrote that he "could

159.
HKSAR v. Megabyte Magnetic Industrial Co., 3 HKC 340 (1996). This case
is not germane to the overall discussion of the Copyright Ordinance because it was
decided under the previous, less strict copyright laws. The appellant in Tan Say Seng
only cites it for the proposition that the statutory interpretation of the defense in the
current Ordinance should create an easier burden for the defense to prove.
160.
Id.
161.

Id.

162.
Id.
163.
Id.
164.
Id. The implication of this argument is that the defendant in this case had
reason to doubt the veracity of his License.
165.
Id.
166.
Id.
167.
Id.
168.
See id.
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accept the evidence of all the witnesses whether called by the
The appellant argued that the
prosecution or the defence. ' 169
magistrate's "change of heart" concerning Chow Ming should raise a
170
doubt about the conviction.
The Court of Appeals disagreed emphatically with this
contention. 171 Within the context of the witnesses' testimony, the Court
of Appeals concluded that the magistrate questioned whether anyone,
172
honest or otherwise, could trust the accuracy of the license issued.
The magistrate did not cast any doubt on the veracity of Chow Ming's
with every ground for appeal
statements, only their accuracy. 173 Thus,
174
denied, the court upheld the conviction.
C. Sentencing
Because a defendant rarely avails himself of the statutory defense,
many defense attorneys have taken a different strategic approach in
representing their clients. They have argued that courts should reduce
criminal fines and sentences because of mitigating circumstances.
Typically, these circumstances revolve around the lack of employment or
education of the defendant. While some defense lawyers have achieved
minimal success in reducing sentences in recent cases, the history of the
case law indicates that Hong Kong courts are still likely to impose and
uphold harsh sentences in an effort to support the law's deterrence goals.
The law leaves wide discretion to judges during the sentencing
phases of Copyright Ordinance offences. 175 In HKSAR v. Wu Wei-Cheng,
the Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's discretion to impose a
sentence based on the totality of the circumstances. 1 76 In this case, the
trial court convicted the appellant of, among other charges, violating the
Copyright Ordinance when a Customs raid revealed 92,242 infringing
VCDs in the apartment of the appellant's sister.' 7 7 The judge imposed a
sentence of three years and three months that hich would run
concurrently with the other charges 178 for which the court convicted

169.

Id.

170.
171.

Id.
Id.

172.
173.

Id.
See id.

174.

Id.

See HKSAR v. Wu Wei-Cheng, [1999] 1143 HKCU 1 (Court of Appeal, 1999),
175.
availableat 1999 HKCU Lexis 919.
176.
Id. at 6. Although a totality of the circumstances approach suggests that
judges have wide latitude to consider mitigating factors, they rarely entertain such
factors. See HKSAR v. Lee Kong, [1999] HKEC 1004, 2 (High Court of the HKSAR
Appellate Jurisdiction, Apr. 22, 1999).
See Wu Wei-Cheng, [1999] HKCU 1, at 1.
177.
178.
Id. Wei-Cheng was also convicted of violating the Control of Obscene and
Indecent Articles Ordinance. Among the over one million VCDs in his sister's
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him.1 79 The judge indicated that he chose to impose such a harsh
sentence because "the number involved is... very substantial"' 8 0 and he
wished to protect "Hong Kong's international reputation as a fair trading
centre .. ."181 Specifically, the trial court indicated that it applied "the
8 2
totality principle of sentencing" in reaching the punishment.
Based on this totality approach and the defendant's belief that the
sentence was excessive, he appealed.18 3 First, the appellant argued that
the trial judge erred in his use of sentencing discretion because he
failed to take account sufficiently or at all that any factors which went to
mitigation in respect to the 1st charge and resulted in a starting point of 2
years imprisonment being reduced to 15 months imprisonment, applied
equally to the 2nd charge in respect of which the sentence of 3 years
imprisonment adopted as the starting point for that charge was imposed
84
in full.1

Essentially, the appellant contended that since the other obscenity
charge leveled against him was the result of possessing 357,679 obscene
VCDs and that the copyright charge against him was the result of
possessing 92,242 infringing VCDs, the obscenity charge, for which the
judge reduced the sentence, was the more significant violation even
though it carried the lighter penalty.'8 5 Thus, the appellant argued, the
court should reduce the sentence for the Copyright charge since it was
86
the less serious offence in terms of the raw number of VCDs involved.'
18 7
The Court of Appeals rejected this reasoning.
The Court
extrapolated that the trial judge had an ultimate sentence to fit the
totality of the crimes and, thus, the allocation of the sentence between
the two charges was irrelevant, especially since the two sentences were

apartment, 357,679 of them were obscene in violation of the statute. The Obscene and
Indecent Articles Ordinance is the legal effort to regulate Apornographic" materials in
Hong Kong. Outlawing all pornography, Hong Kong law defines such materials to
include exposure of genitalia. Thus, the law draws a fine line between illegal
pornography and the legal pornoviolence of category III films.
179.
Id. at 2.
180.
Id. at 5.
181.
Id. Again, the court's language seems to acknowledge the interests of
transnational trade.
182.
Id. at 6.
183.
See id. at 7.
184.
Id.
185.
Id. This fact is also interesting from the standpoint that it reveals the
greater significance the court places on copyright infringements rather than obscenity.
Although obscene materials are strictly outlawed in Hong Kong and the Copyright
Ordinance is a controversial law, the court reduced the sentence for the obscenity
offence and not the copyright offence. This decision shows the greater emphasis Hong
Kong places on copyright and that the legal system is less forgiving of these offenses
than other crimes.
186.
See id.
187.
Id. at 9.
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to run concurrently. 18 8 The balancing of the two sentences was within
the judge's discretion and was part of his attempt to achieve "ultimate
189
totality."
Next, the appellant argued that the sentence was "manifestly
excessive and wrong in principle." 190 The Court of Appeals dismissed
this claim with little explanation, merely saying that it was within the
judge's discretion to look at all the facts, conclude that the defendant
was more than a bit player in this piracy scheme and impose a sentence
accordingly.191
Even in cases where the trial judge imposes a light sentence or
suspends it entirely, the Secretary for Justice can, and often does,
petition the Court of Appeals to enforce a harsher sentence. 192 In the
pivotal case of Secretary for Justice v. Choi Sai Lok & Anor, the
Secretary appealed the trial judge's decision to suspend the sentences of
two men found guilty of violating the Copyright Ordinance. 193 On April
5, 1998, police detained the two respondents whom they had observed
carrying cartons that contained 719 infringing VCDs. 194
The
respondents admitted that they worked for man called "h Hung" and
were paid $350 a day to deliver compact discs they knew contained
pirated material. 195 In addition, the police found on the second
respondent a set of keys that unlocked a room in a nearby building
where the police discovered "paraphanelia used for labeling, pricing and
packing" VCDs. 196 Based on these facts, both men admitted their guilt
at trial. 197 Section 118(1)(d) of the Copyright Ordinance allows the trial
judge to impose a sentence of up to $25,000 and two years imprisonment
for each of these offences, 198 but the trial judge suspended the
sentences.

199

188.
See id. at 8.
189.
Id. Nevertheless, even if the trial judge had an ultimate sentence in mind,
his emphasis in attributing the majority of the sentence to the Copyright Ordinance
infringements indicates which crime the court considered more serious.
190.
Id. at 9.
191.
Id. The Court of Appeals' decision not to outline a structure for sentencing
is significant because it leaves the trial judge indeterminate discretion to enforce a law
aimed at deterrence.
192.
See Sec'y for Justice v. Choi Sai Lok, [1999] 4 HKC 334 (Court of Appeal
1999), availableat 1999 HKC Lexis 75.
193.
Id. at 5.
194.
Id. at 9.
195.
Id. The defendant's admission suggests that the Copyright Ordinance has
been sufficiently publicized. Otherwise, they would not refer to the VCDs as Apirated."
196.
Id. at 10.
197.
Id. at 11.
198.
Id. at 6.
199.
Id. at 11.
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Applying a totality approach, 200 the trial judge acknowledged that
"the seriousness with which these offences are now viewed would clearly
make some form of custodial sentence the norm rather than the
exception when persons are convicted of being involved in this illegal
enterprise . .. 201 Nevertheless, the judge also recognized that case law
in the area of imposing Copyright Ordinance sentences varied widely
based on the facts and that none of those cases established a precedent
for the facts presented in this case. 202 Furthermore, because the judge
viewed the respondents as "transporters of goods rather than
distributors," he decided that the facts 20 3 warranted suspending the
20 4
sentences.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with this reasoning and imposed
20 5
custodial sentences of six and nine months on the respondents.
Recognizing the Copyright Ordinance and the sentences it imposes as an
effort to deter future violations, 20 6 the higher court acknowledged that
there was no case law directly addressing this issue and that "a
distinction should be drawn between the proprietors of retail outlets and
warehouses who commit these offences, and the persons employed by
them. '20 7 Nevertheless, the court also recognized that there is not much
difference between a warehouse owner and a courier of infringing VCDs
as it pertains to criminal culpability.20 8 Instead, trial judges can elect
not to impose the maximum sentence for deliverymen and employees, 20 9
but an individual's status as a mere employee "will not warrant the
2 10
suspension of an otherwise appropriate sentence of imprisonment.
The Court of Appeals established this rule because
despite their efforts the Customs and Excise appear to have been unable
so far to catch the big fish of the trade and can only bring the minnows
before the courts. Without their salesmen, however, the big fish cannot
operate and so the salesmen must be deterred. Experience has shown that
they are not deterred by fines, so that resort needs to be had to custodial
sentences, even where the offender is a young person with a clear record.

200.
See id.
201.
Id. Here, the judge reveals that the harsher penalties of the new Ordinance
are being enforced.
202.
Id. at 12.
203.
See id. at 13. Not only were the men not the salespeople or owners of the
infringing VCDs, but the judge also considered the facts that they were family men who
had worked all their lives at honest jobs. This case is a rare example of a judge
considering mitigating factors when imposing sentence.
204.
Id.
205.
Id. at 18.
206.
See id. at 12.
207.
Id. at 15.
208.
Id. at 15-16.
209.
See id.
210.
Id. at 16. Although the court acknowledges the impact of mitigating factors
under a totality approach, the result is still imprisonment.
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That is a clear echo of the thinking behind the sentencing, for example, of
2 11
couriers in the narcotics trade.

Thus, after Choi Sai Lok, the courts have been required to impose
custodial sentences, even when they found mitigating factors or when
Additionally, the court
the defendant has a sympathetic plea.
acknowledged that age and prior criminal records should not sway a
judge from imposing a custodial sentence. Although this reasoning
seems to undercut the "totality of the circumstances" principle, the
concern for deterrence has defeated any semblance of stare decisis or
consistent reasoning in this line of sentencing cases.
This inconsistent trend continued in the Court of First Instance
decision in HKSAIR v. Kong Tak Wah. 212 In this case, the defendant at
trial plead guilty to violating the Copyright Ordinance when he offered
for sale 6,906 VCDs and 480 MCDs without the approval of the copyright
owners. 213 The judge sentenced him to ten months imprisonment and
the defendant appealed that sentence on the grounds that it was too
harsh. 214 In rejecting the argument that the sentence was excessive, the
appellate court cited the reasoning underlying the Choi Sai Lok decision
215
and also referred to its earlier reasoning in the Lee Kong decision.
Nevertheless, the appellant argued that the sentence was excessive
for specific reasons. First, he contended that he only admitted to
possessing 3,507 infringing copies in his guilty plea, but the judge
improperly took into account the over 7,000 infringing copies the police
discovered in the defendant's possession.2 16 The appellate court,
however, rejected this contention because the defendant knew that he
was pleading guilty to a charge alleging he possessed over 7000
infringing copies and if he disputed that number, then he should not
have plead guilty to the charge or he should have argued for an amended
217
charge.
Finally, the appellant argued that the magistrate erred by not
considering suspension of the sentence. 218 Counsel for the defendant
argued that because his client was a married man who only turned to
this crime because of an economic slowdown, the court should have

211.
Id. at 16-17. The comparison to the narcotics trade is an interesting one
that has not gone unnoticed by this Author. Although the focus of this paper is not to
draw comparisons between the illegal trafficking of VCDs and narcotics, the obvious
parallels between the two criminal enterprises cannot be denied and warrant further
exploration in future papers and articles.
212.
See HKSAR v. Kong Tak Wah, [1999] HKEC 581 (Court of First Instance
Appellate Jurisdiction 1999), availableat 1999 WL 33578706.
Id.
213.
Id.
214.
215.
Id. at 2-4.
216.
Id. at 4.
217.
Id.
218.
Id.
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considered, or at least addressed, the possibility of suspension. 2 19 The
appellate court, however, was not persuaded and although they did not
cite any specific case, the court stated that "the Magistrate was bound,
and so am I, by the line of authorities cited above that the Courts must
impress upon the community that they are determined to stamp out this
kind of offence. ' 220 Most likely, that "line of authorities" included Choi
Sai Lok and its adherence to rigid deterrence over mitigating factors
such as the defendant's social status or prior criminal record.
Recently, however, some Hong Kong courts have taken a few small
steps back from the rigid sentencing guidelines of Choi Sai Lok. In
HKSAR v. Poon Mei Fun, the High Court suspended a 15-month
sentence imposed by a trial judge. 221 The case involved a defendant who
22 2
sold 15 copyright-infringing VCDs to undercover customs officers.
The trial court found her guilty and imposed a custodial sentence of 15
months. 223 On appeal, the defendant argued that the sentence was too
22 4
harsh for such a minor infraction-only 15 VCDs.
The appellate court acknowledged that the precedent in Choi Sai
Lok did not make any distinctions based on age when imposing a
sentence, but in this case the court nevertheless revived a totality of the
circumstances approach. 225 Despite the fact that the defendant sold
copyright-infringing VCDs to the officers, the court noted that the
defendant was a "family girl, living at home with her family, she did very
well at school, certainly above average and she had hoped to save up
money to go and study abroad. '22 6 Additionally, the defendant was not a
full-time employee of the shop and had only gone to the store that day to
help out a busy friend. 227 Consequently, based on these mitigating facts,
2 28
the court suspended the sentence for two years.
While this decision appeared to signal a victory for defendants in
Copyright Ordinance trials, the decision did not overturn Choi Sai
Lok. 229 Courts may still look to that precedent to guide them during
sentencing. Furthermore, the court in this case acknowledged that
copyright piracy had become "a particular problem" 230 and that the

219.
Id. at 5-7.
220.
Id. at 8. It is logical to assume that the court referred to the Choi Sai Lok
decision.
221.
HKSAR v. Poon Mei Fun, [2002] HKEC 1081, *2 (High Court of the HKSAR
Court of First Instance 2002), available on WESTLAW at 2 HKLRD H8.
222.
Id.
223.
Id.
224.
Id.
225.
See id. at *4.
226.
Id. at *3-4.
227.
Id. at *4.
228.
Id. at *7.
229.
See id.
230.
Id. at *6.
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reputation of Hong Kong was at stake if the government did nothing to
crack down on this problem. 231 Taking into consideration the court's
continuing concern with copyright piracy, this decision did not provide a
solid basis for future defendants to use when arguing against harsh
sentences. The court did not establish a standard to determine when a
defendant can avoid custodial sentences. With Choi Sai Lok still in
place, the only possible standard this precedent established was that
good students who sell 15 copyright infringing VCDs or less should
receive a suspended sentence. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that
arguing mitigating factors in sentencing, while more effective than
arguing the statutory defense, is not likely to result in a reduced
sentence for guilty defendants.
D. Recent Changes in the Ordinance
The aforementioned judicial decisions and interpretations of the
Copyright Ordinance have established the law as it is enforced today.
Ultimately, the Copyright Ordinance has pervaded other areas of Hong
Kong culture and intellectual property beyond film and
entertainment. 232 In April 2001, the government of Hong Kong extended
the Copyright Ordinance impositions to teachers and educators who
photocopied texts and pictures for educational purposes, and this
extension of the law resulted in a general public backlash against the
policy. 233 The Legislature responded to the backlash by suspending the
Copyright Ordinance. 234 The suspension, however, did not "cover piracy
of films, television dramas, video or sound recording, or computer
software. '235 The Secretary of Commerce reasoned that "these four
areas faced 'rampant piracy problems' and 'the SAR's international
image would be greatly damaged' if the suspension was extended into
such areas. '236 Thus, despite the recent rolling back of the copyright
laws in Hong Kong, their application to the underground VCD market
has continued. Regrettably, those laws have also failed to solve the
problem.

231.

See id.

232.

See generally Copyright OrdinancePartiallySuspended, HONG KONG IMAIL,

June 21, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File, Most Recent Two Years. The
article briefly recognizes the Copyright Ordinance's influence in areas beyond VCDs,
including sound recordings, computer software, and the photocopying of texts and
pictures for educational purposes.
233.
See id.
234.
Id.
235.
Id.
236.
Id.
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III. THE LEGAL ANSWER
The Copyright Ordinance has not effectively deterred piracy of film
copyrights. While this conclusion is based on the holdings, assumptions,
and inferences of the case law and the dissatisfaction of the film industry
with regard to this ongoing threat to its intellectual property, one must
concede that no definitive answer to the deterrence question can be
reached without the aid of a socio-economic analysis of the underground
VCD market and the criminal activities and attitudes of those people
engaged in this activity before and after the passage of the Ordinance.
There are many factors germane to any deterrence analysis and, thus
far, there is no conclusive statistical evidence on either side of the
deterrence debate to evaluate the Ordinance's effectiveness. Therefore,
a comprehensive study should be conducted to discern the number of
trials and convictions for piracy pre-Ordinance, the number of trials and
convictions post-Ordinance, whether potential criminal pirates or
recidivists are aware of the new Ordinance and the harsher penalties it
imposes, whether there has elapsed any gap of time between the 1997
passage of the law and enforcement by Customs, and whether the people
charged or convicted under this statute were of rational mind.
Nevertheless, despite the lack of a study to answer these questions, the
conclusions and inferences ascertainable from the available evidence
strongly suggest that the Copyright Ordinance has failed as a legal
deterrent to piracy and Hong Kong should explore alternative methods
to address this problem.
A. The Failureof Deterrence
Undoubtedly, the goal of the Copyright Ordinance is to deter future
infringements on intellectual property. 237 The statute attempts to
impose this deterrence by assessing harsher penalties than existed
under previous copyright laws. 23 8 In this respect, the Hong Kong law is
an attempt at general deterrence in the classic model.
Deterrence can best be described as consequentialist insofar as it
attempts to prevent the consequences of sentences. 23 9 It relies on
threats and fears. In Hong Kong, the threats contained in the Copyright
Ordinance are obvious: heavy fines and incarceration for each offense.

237.
See HKSAR v. Lee Kong, 1999 435 HKCU 1, available at 1999 WL 33577977;
Sec'y for Justice v. Choi Sai Lok, [1999] 4 HKC 334 (Court of Appeal 1999), availableat
1999 HKC Lexis 75; Lai, supra note 25, at 24.
238 See infra Part II.
239 Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing Aims, Principles,and Policies, in FOUNDATIONS OF
CRIMINAL LAW 333, 335 (Leo Katz ed., 1999).
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The Ordinance, like most efforts at deterrence, is a general one. General
deterrence is premised on the assumption that the law applies to
everyone equally, not just specific individuals such as repeat
offenders. 240 Further, the goal of this model is to maximize social utility.
Accordingly, the law should inflict pain and punishment sufficient to
deter others from engaging in similar conduct. 24 1 The writings of
Jeremy Bentham and his utilitarian response to Blackstone provide the
philosophical underpinning of this view. 242 More recently, economic
theorists, including Richard Posner, have justified this general theory of
deterrence as punishment based on a pricing system. 243 Under either
approach, the goal of the deterrence is to prevent future violations of the
law by imposing a daunting penalty on would be offenders.
Not surprisingly, there are many criticisms of this general theory of
deterrence. Most of this criticism is empirical. Thus far, the criminal
justice systems have yet to develop a reliable method to collect and
analyze findings about the relative effectiveness of deterrence for various
crimes. 244 Furthermore, general deterrence rests on the assumption
that the criminal is of rational mind and will act in his own selfinterest. 245 Some studies, including one by Richard Harding, argue that
the professional criminal refrains from certain forms of offense during
the planning stages of their crimes. 246 This study, however, rests on the
assumptions that the criminal is "professional," plans his crimes well in
advance, and is aware of the potential penalty for breaking the law. In
essence, this study is premised on the idea that the law is well known
and the criminal is of rational mind.

240.
See id. at 336. The concept of individual, or special, deterrence is premised
on the assumption that certain people, usually recidivists, are the target of the
deterrent effect. Thus, special deterrence efforts take the form of escalating penalties
for repeat offenders. Conversely, general deterrence aims at harsh, yet consistent,
penalties for all offenders regardless of prior convictions. The Hong Kong ordinance is
best characterized as general because it makes no distinctions.
241.
Id.
242.
See id. Bentham, a London lawyer and philosopher, was troubled by the
publishing of Blackstone's treatises because he believed the law should be developed to
facilitate the greatest good for the greatest number of people. It is not the goal of this
Note to analyze the philosophical assumptions of Bentham, but instead suggest the
philosophical basis of the general deterrence model. For a brief overview of Bentham's
work and theories see BluPete.com, BluPete Biographies: Jeremy Bentham, at
http://www.blupete.com/ Literature/Biographies/Philosophy/Bentham.htm.
243.
See Ashworth, supra note 239, at 336.
244.
Id.
245.
See id.
246.
Id. The Harding study examined laws that imposed extra penalties on
robbers who carried firearms. The study found that "professional" criminals, who
planned out their crimes well in advance, were less likely to risk the extra penalties and
not carry any firearms. Harding, however, admits that publicity must accompany these
harsher penalties for them to have any effect.
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The Hong Kong law fails to meet the requirements of this model.
While the law does appear to be well known, the fact remains that VCD
piracy remains a serious problem because would-be offenders do not
make rational decisions when choosing to engage in the prohibited
activity. It is reasonable to conclude that the Copyright Ordinance is
well known because it has received extensive publicity in the Hong Kong
media. 247 The South China Morning Post frequently publishes articles
concerning the "piracy problem" and Hong Kong consumers are well
aware that the VCDs are illegal. 248 Polls indicate that Hong Kong
consumers do not favor the law, thus demonstrating that the public at
large is familiar with the Ordinance. 249 Furthermore, defendants, both
sophisticated manufacturers and common distributors, in previous
prosecutions indicated that they were cognizant of the Ordinance when
they broke the law. 250 In Mega Laser, the defendants indicated their
awareness of copyright laws when they asked Cheung Ying about the
copyright status of the films they intended to reproduce. 25 1 In Choi Sai
Lok, the defendants admitted that the VCDs were pirate copies and their
shows that
attempt to hide the illicit products in a nearby apartment
252
they were aware of legal repercussions for their actions.
Thus, because the offenders knew about the law when they sold
pirated VCDs, the breakdown in the deterrence model must be found
elsewhere. Most likely, the deterrence failed because the defendants are
of irrational mind. The mitigating factors that defendants often cite
(e.g., economic necessity) suggest that the offenders believe they must
break the law. 253 In Lee Kong, the defendant only worked for a VCD
counterfeiter because he could not find another job.254 The defendants in
Choi Sai Lok took a similar approach. 255 Whether taking these jobs
qualifies the defendants as irrational is not relevant. At the very least,
it shows that the current economic realities in Hong Kong force these
people, at least in their own estimation, to take work that runs afoul of
the Copyright Ordinance. Some offenders, especially professional VCD
manufacturers, may not confront the economic necessity of distributors,
but their rationalizations that they can avoid prosecution has the same
effect of taking the teeth out of the deterrent. Whether they rely on the

247.
See Wan, supra note 5, at 4; Li, supra note 22, at 4; Lai, supra note 25, at 24.
248.
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249.
See Legco Survey, supra note 14.
250.
See HKSAR v. Mega Laser Prod. Ltd. [1999] HKEC 1100, availableat 1999
WL 33578066; Sec'y for Justice v. Choi Sai Lok, [1999] 4 HKC 334 (Court of Appeal
1999), availableat 1999 HKC Lexis 75.
251.
See Mega Laser, [1999] HKEC 1100.
252.
See Choi Sai Lok, [1999] 4 HKC 334.
See, e.g., HKSAR v. Lee Kong, [1999] HKEC 1004 (High Court of HKSAR
253.
App. Juris. Apr. 22, 1999), available at 1999 WL 33577977.
254.
Id.
See Choi Sai Lok, [1999] 4 HKC 334.
255.
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statements of others like the defendants in Mega Laser,2 56 or if they try
to obtain a license that they reasonably should know will not carry much
weight in a HKSAR court like the defendants in Tang Say Seng,25 7 the
deterrence does not affect this class of defendants because they believe
they can avoid punishment. Thus, the deterrent, while known, fails
because the penalty it imposes is insufficient to overcome the offender's
deep-rooted belief that they must break the law or will not be caught.
Other criticisms of the general deterrence model are founded in
principle, not empiricism. These critics argue that under a utilitarian
approach to deterrence, the punishment of an innocent person is justified
if that punishment deters others from committing the crime in the
future. 258 More realistically, there exists the potential for exemplary
sentences that single out one offender with a harsh sentence to deter
future offenders. 25 9 In the past, English judges have actually imposed
exemplary sentences for deterrence purposes. 26 0 The discretion afforded
judges in the HKSAR suggests that if judges have not yet imposed
exemplary penalties, the possibility of imposing such a sentence
certainly exists. Regardless of these principled arguments, however, the
failure of the law within a classical deterrence framework justifies its
reexamination.
Even if both the Copyright Ordinance decisions and the fact that
piracy is growing does not persuade that the deterrent has failed, the
statements and requests of the Customs Department and the
transnational film industry reveal that they-the proponents of the
law-believe the deterrent has failed. In March 1999, two years after
the enactment of the law, the Customs Department petitioned the
government to hire 48 new enforcement officers. 26 1 While one could
speculate that Customs requested the manpower increases to make the
deterrent more visible, the statements of the Customs department do not
support this argument. 26 2 Customs admitted that the new officers would
coordinate raids and formulate enforcement strategies. 26 3 The most
obvious conclusion from this statement is that despite efforts during the
past two years, VCD piracy remains prevalent and Customs required

256.

See HKSAR v. Mega Laser Prod. Ltd., [19991 HKEC 1100 (Ct. of App., June
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260.
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261.
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262.
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and its penalties are already known to would-be offenders.
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more officers to combat the criminals. Furthermore, at the time of the
request, the Secretary for Trade and Industry admitted that the public
2 64
needed to change its attitude toward pirated goods and not buy them.
This statement suggests that the deterrent either had not achieved the
notoriety required to make it effective under a general deterrence model
(because demand still existed and criminals were either not aware of, or
were more willing to risk, harsher sanctions to supply that demand), or
that the HKSAR had begun to realize that the real solution lay in
curbing supply and demand, not deterring future actions.
The statements urging that the Copyright Ordinance deterrent
failed were not limited to only the HKSAR government. The film
industry, years after the enactment of the Ordinance, continues to
express concerns that piracy is growing. Hollywood insiders intimated
that the continuing problem of piracy might force them to stop bringing
big-budget films to Hong Kong. 265
In the spring of 1999, a
representative for Universal, Paramount, and MGM lamented that the
almost immediate availability of pirated copies of their films on the
266
streets of Hong Kong made it unprofitable to release the films there.
Another industry report acknowledged the increased number of raids
and seizures since the passage of the law, but also acknowledged that
the market for piracy continues to boom despite the crackdown. 267 The
manufacturers and distributors appear to have adapted their techniques
to combat the Customs enforcement techniques. The report indicated
that AVCD's are retailed using low-inventory business methods that
minimize the impact of C&E Division raids, and allow outlets to reopen
within days or even hours after closure. '268 This adaptability suggests
that the professional VCD pirates, rather than being deterred under a
Harding model, are actually altering their methods of retail at the
planning stage so as to subvert the goals of the Ordinance.
The U.S. film industry is not alone in its concerns and criticisms. In
the eyes of the Hong Kong film industry, the Ordinance has also failed.
Its concerns reached a cathartic level during a 1999 protest march led by
their biggest star, Jackie Chan. 269 The 1600-person protest emphasized
that 20,000 people in the industry lost jobs as a result of piracy leading
to reduced film revenues. 270 Chan warned that if the current levels of
piracy continue, within the next few years the industry may not produce
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See Pegg, supra note 48, at 1.
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See supra note 47. The report laments the disturbing trend of U.S. releases
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any more domestic films. 271 In trying to allay the concerns of protestors,
Customs indicated that they shut down many plants manufacturing the
2 72
illegal discs and had seized over $39 million worth of pirated products.
These raids, however, were not particularly effective in stemming the
tide of illegal products reaching the black markets because most of the
manufacturing plants simply moved their facilities to Macau and then
smuggled their discs into Hong Kong through the mainland or on
2 73
boats.
Ultimately, the Copyright Ordinance has failed to deter. It has
instead granted sweeping police power to the Customs department,
resulting in the interference of legitimate business, and has spawned a
lamentable series of decisions from HKSAR courts. All the while, piracy
continues and the original proponents of the Copyright Ordinance call
for new action. Thus, the time has arrived for Hong Kong to consider
new legal answers.
B. Alternative Solutions
The goal of this Note is to suggest possible legal solutions to the
problem of VCD piracy. Nevertheless, there are obvious social solutions
that should be acknowledged. Since the deterrent value of the statute
has failed, the most likely alternative solution involves reducing either
the supply or the demand for the pirated products. From a social
standpoint, demand for illegal VCDs will most likely swoon if the
demand for category III films also decreases. Because category III films
are both a substantial source of illegal VCD sales and they also
discourage patrons from attending the cinemas, this type of film has had
a profound effect on the demand for all illegal VCD products. While
many social theorists could proffer diverse theories as to how changes in
Hong Kong culture could affect the demand for category III fare, this
Note will not attempt to propose one. It should be noted, however, that
while attempting to reduce illegal VCD purchasing by changing the
entire social landscape of Hong Kong may seem daunting, the answer
could be as simple as producing higher quality alternative forms of
entertainment such as television programs. 2 7 4 While these shifts in
cultural attitudes could certainly result in decreased demand for
category III films, this Note focuses on three potential legal solutions.
First, because the deterrent contained in the Copyright Ordinance
has failed, one can argue that for it to become effective the Legislature
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should amend the Ordinance to create even harsher penalties for
distributors and manufacturers. Harsher penalties, promotion of the
new law, and strict enforcement could result in a more effective
deterrent that would decrease the supply of illegal VCDs. This
argument, however, is the least persuasive of the three offered. An
amendment would suffer from the same problems plaguing the current
deterrent effort: promotion of the new law, lack of a rational mind on
behalf of the offenders, and changing techniques on the part of the
criminals to avoid sanction. Furthermore, because there already exists a
lack of hard data to support the conclusion that the current deterrent
could be effective, it is logical to conclude that there would be no data to
justify support for an even harsher deterrent. This solution could only
be effective if a study can show that a certain level of punishment can
deter the activities of these irrational criminals.
Second, the Hong Kong film industry has called for a new law aimed
at deterring customers from purchasing pirated VCDs. 2 7 5 In theory,
imposing fines on people who buy illegal VCDs should reduce the
demand for the product. The HKSAR government, however, has stated
its reluctance to pass such a law2 76 and the attitudes of the consumers
suggests that they would continue to seek out the pirated copies despite
fines. 277 This fact raises the question of whether consumers are of
rational mind. Furthermore, this solution is merely another attempt at
deterrence, albeit deterrence aimed at the consumer and not the
manufacturers and distributors. Thus, it would encounter the already
identified problems associated with deterrence.
Arguably the best alternative to deterrence attempts would be to
change the definition of pornography-a category of films that are
banned in Hong Kong-to include category III films. As seen in Wu WeiCheng, the defendant distributed both category III VCDs and illegal
pornographic VCDs. 2 7 8 The court found him guilty of distributing the
VCDs because he did not hold the copyright, but the violation of the
Obscenity Ordinance was a strict liability violation. 279
Tight
government controls on this hardcore pornography makes it
exceptionally hard to find and most pornographic films, called ham-sup
28 0
pin, available on VCD are imported from overseas countries.
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Importing ham-sup pin, rather than manufacturing it locally, drives up
the costs of these VCDs and, in turn, reduces demand. Thus, whether
for reasons of strict liability creating a deterrent or stringent
government controls, the supply and demand for pornographic films is
substantially less than it is for category III. Therefore, a reclassification
of category III films, or at least the "pornoviolence" category III films, as
ham-sup pin could reduce the supply and demand for illegal VCDs. Also,
by reducing the number of category III films produced, the film industry
could attract more customers back into the theaters and away from
home viewing of illegally produced VCDs. With fewer category III films
available for viewing in the theaters, consumers who previously avoided
theaters (and the patrons of category III films) may prove willing to
return to the theaters to view categories I and II films.
Ultimately, the problem of VCD film piracy is a growing one. It has
not dissipated in the years since the passage of the Copyright Ordinance
despite judicial efforts to strengthen the deterrent effectiveness.
Consequently, the HKSAR government must consider new solutions to
this serious problem. Reducing the supply and demand of category III
films should return customers to the mainstream film market and, in
time, obviate the need for a Copyright Ordinance pertaining to films.
Allen Woods*
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